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J,

INTRODUCTION

Before federal sentencing refonn limited judicial discretion, defendants
often trembled at the thought that "the law is what the judge had for breakfast."
Certain culinary items suggested light sentences geared towards rehabilitation
(eggs over easy, instant oatmeal, Sweet 'N Low, Lucky Channs, and Cheerios).
Ho\vever, others evoked harsher irnages of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation (hard boiled eggs, bacon extra crisp, and especially Total, Life, or
any type of toast). Of course, if the judge had dined on waffles or Fruit Loops
(as often seemed to be the case), all bets were off.
Except for statutory caps, federal judges e1tjoyed wide latitude with
virtually no appellate review. Under this open-ended system, trial judges could
always finish the day content that justice had been served. Regardless of
whether they had tempered justice with mercy or sent a tough,on-crime
message, their judgment was always right-or at least not subject to meaningful
appeal.'
Congress, however, did not share this confidence. Judicial discretion
had produced wide disparities in sentencing similarly situated offenders.' When
1nore than 500 trial judges each applied his or her own sense of justice without
any governing standard, unwarranted disparity inevitably occurred. For a nation
grounded in equal justice, this situation proved intolerable. Congress responded
by enacting the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984.'
The Act had two goals: (1) removing unwarranted disparities; and
(2) producing "truth in sentencing" by eliminating parole,' which had allowed
'B.S., 1972; J.D., 1975, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Brigham Young
University; fonner Vice-Chair, United States Sentencing Commission. This
article is an edited transcript of a speech given by Professor Goldsmith at the
Fortunoff Colloquium on Criminal Justice at New York University School of
Law. The views expressed herein are those of the Authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
"B.A., 1991, Yale University; J.D., 1995, University of Virginia; Associate,
Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; fonner Attorney-Adviser, United
States Sentencing Conunission.

many defendants to serve only one-third of their sentences.' Under the Act,
Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission and directed it
to produce a sentencing systetn in \Vhich each crhne carried a definite
irnprisorunent range, subject to adjushnent for specific offense characteristics
and the offendef's criminal history. 6
The resulting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' recenlly marked their tenth
anniversary, but many observers of the federal criminal justice system found
little to celebrate about the continued existence of this revolutionary system.
That it is revolutionary is not in doubt. Even Second Circuit Judge Jose
Cabranes-one of the guidelines' 1nost vocal critics-admits that the guidelines
are one of this century's n1ost significant develop1nents in federal
jurisprudence.' The guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act that created
them did a\vay \Vith parole and rnoved to a ntodel of deten11inate sentencing
under which judges must follow the guidelines' detailed sentencing calculus.
What is in doubt is whether the guidelines represent an advance in our
nation's approach to criminal Ja,v, or a step back\vard-a "disn1al failure," as
Judge Cabranes so bluntly asserted a few years ago.' My goal is to convince

you that lhe guidelines are in fact a surprising success, indeed that they represent
a step fonvard in federal crhninal justice.
This goal is no small task. Criticisms of the guidelines are not hard lo
find. When the guidelines were first introduced in the late eighties, the chorus
of hisses and boos from the federal bench was deafening. Academics and
practitioners were not kindly disposed either. Of the more thau 600 articles
written about the guidelines, only a handful have been favorable. Far more

common are those \vhose titles contain terms such as Hfailure," "mess,"
"unacceptable," "death,1' "disease," and "fla\ved." 10 Indeed, about the 111ost
neutral description I could find appeared in a few articles that merely referred to

the guidelines as "controversial." 11
Not to be discouraged, I conducted a Westla\v search for articles \Vhose
titles combined the terms "guidelines" and "love." This, surprisingly enough,
triggered one response: an article in the Wisconsin Law Review by former

Commission staffer Frank Bo\vman, no\V a professor ofla\v. 12
Encouraged by this response, I then searched Westlaw for articles

combining the tem1s "guidelines" and "cheer." TI1is, too, produced a single
response: "One Cheer for the Guidelines," by federal judge Stuart Dalzell. 13 (I
was unable to find any articles entitled "A Second Cheer for the Guidelines" or
"How I Learned to Stop Worrying About Those Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.") Given the dearth of favorable legal reviews, I am especially
indebted to Professor Bowman and Judge Dalzell for helping me to defend a
system that has been so widely attacked, and I rely heavily on their work for this
presentation.
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The guidelines' critics, however numerous, tend to identify only four
overarching problems with the system. First, they say, the guidelines take the
"human element" out of sentencing by prohibiting the use of certain factors that
were key to judges' sentencing decisions in the pre-guidelines era. 14 Second, the
factors that are not prohibited are assigned a pre-detem1ined weight, thus
robbing judges of any meaningful discretion and transferring power to the
prosecution." TI1ird, the sentences that result from application of the guidelines

are too long. 16 And fourth, the guidelines are too con1plex. 17
TI1ere is some merit to these criticisms. But none of them compels the
conclusion that the guidelines system is a failure. Al worst, they identify areas
in \Vhich the Sentencing Comn1ission and Congress can make ilnprovements.
By reviewjng these criticis1ns one at a time, I hope to convince you that the
current system is in fact working rather well, and that the future only looks
brighter.
IJ,

PROHIBITED FACTORS

First, the jjprohibited factors" argument. Critics of the guidelines
farnent the absence of certain defendant characteristics from the guidelines'
sentencing calculus: age, en1ploytnent status, \York history, education, farnily,
community lies, et cetera." These were the very factors that judges used in the
pre~guidelines era to uhumanizeu and individualize sentencing. For exan1ple, a
judge might generally have had an idea of how a bank robber should be
sentenced, but this general notion was fine-tuned by considering the personal
factors that made the robber 'vho he or she 'vas. The guidelines, ho,vever,
expressly categorize these san1e characteristics as 11not ordinarily relevant.n 19
It's no wonder that the bench didn't like this new way of doing things.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for restricting the use of these
characteristics. Chief among them is their unpredictable effect. Professor
Bowman posits the following example:" suppose we have two defendants, both
convicted of fraud. One is a twenty-one year-old Mexican inunigrant, raised by
a grandparent after his drng-abusing mother abandoned him at age ten. A high
school dropout with a history of gang involvement and a series of increasingly
serious crimes on his juvenile record, he's before the court because he stole
credit cards from the mail and ran up over $9,000,000 in unauthorized charges.
The second defendant is a fifty-five year-old white male, married, with
three children. He's a graduate of the NYU and has been a bank vice president
for years, \vith a spotless employtnent record. A rnember of several civic and
charitable associations, he coaches a youth soccer team -and is a long-time
vestryman at the local Episcopalian church. He's in trouble with the law for the
first time, for having embezzled $9,000,000 from his employer during the
course of the last few years.
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At sentencing, the Latino youth's lawyer would probably argue that the
defendant's troubled upbringing, tender years, lack of guidance, and poor
education mitigated the seriousness of his conduct. The prosecutor, ho\vevcr,

would likely look at these same factors in light of the youth's prior record and
argue that the defendant has not lean1ed his lesson frorn past incidents, and thus

poses a serious threat ofrecidivism. 21
Meanwhile, in the courtroom next door, the attorney for the "pillar of
the community" embezzler is pointing to a theretofore spotless life, adorned
\Vith various fonns of service to the conmn1nity, a loving and dependent fa1nily,
and an unblemished reputation-the sullying of which alone constitutes
·adequate punislunent. The prosecutor also cites these factors, but asserts that

this defendant is for those very same reasons especially unsympathetic. He had
every advantage that society could bestow, and he threw it all away simply for
greed."
No\v, in the pre-guideJines era (Professor Bo,vman argues) the outcon1e
of these hvo cases depended entirely on the l\vorld vie,v" of the sentencing

judge." If the judge thought that the young credit card thief had just never
gotten a fair shake from society and deserved another chance, he could receive
nothing more than a stem \Yarning and routine visits \Vith a probation officer. If
the judge thought that this kid was beyond redemption, and that society's best
hope \Vas to keep hitn off the streets for as long as possible, then the statutory
maximum sentence might be imposed.
Likewise, if the judge sees the banker as a productive, worthy, and
respected member of the comn1unity who \Vas guilty of no more than one
aberrant error of judgment, probation could be the result. If the judge were
instead to focus on greed, and betrayal of the system that had bestowed so much
favor on the defendant, a long prison tenn rnight a\vait the embezzler. 24
A tough call in both cases, especially since neither of these outcomes is
necessarily "right" or 11 \Vrong." 25 Youth is usually an indicator for a high risk of
recidivistn,26 but young defendants are also often seen as rnore deserving of a
chance for rehabilitation. The white collar criminal may be deterred .by sheer
embarrassrnent and other fonns of social disapprobation associated \Vith
conviction, thus lessening the need for incarceration, 27 but retributive principles
argue for harsher treatinent of those \Vho had every advantage society had to
offer but who nevertheless transgressed. In any event, the idea that anyone
could consistently sort through these different goals and principles to produce
the 11 right1' sentence in each case is illusory.
Furthermore, there is another danger in relying too closely on factors
such as age, employment, education, and family history. As Judge Dalzell has
observed, those characteristics can easily correlate \vith factors that everyone
agrees should not be considered, such as race, sex, national origin, and maybe
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even religion." One need only look at the recent controversy over the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine sentences to realize that an ostensibly wellintentioned and race-neutral sentencing policy can produce problematic
results. 29
Given these difficulties, the most reasonable approach for these
personal defendant characteristics is to de-emphasize them and to focus instead
on more objective criteria: the criminal conduct itself and the defendant's
history of criminal convictions. And that's exactly what the federal guidelines
do. All the calculations under the guidelines culminate in a sentencing table, in
which the Yaxis represents the seriousness of the defendant's offense and the X
axis represents the defendant's criminal record.'° Cross-referencing these two
factors produces a sentencing range, the top of \Vhich n1ay be no n1ore than
twenty-five percent higher than the bottom." The jndge is then free to choose
any sentence \vithin that range. 32
This is an important point, because it shows that the guidelines do not
completely bar consideration of these factors I have been discussing. The
guidelines only say that these factors are not ordinarily relevant in determining
which range applies to a given case. Once the range of potential prison terms
has been detennined, judges are free to apply whatever factors they see fit in
choosing the futal sentence. Professor Bowman calls it "a hierarchy of
sentencing values--0ffense severity first, prior criminal history second, [and]
personal characteristics third."33 To me, this ranking represents an itnprovement
over what came before; it's a happy compromise between the fear of a
"dehumanized" sentencing process on the one hand and the danger of
unacceptable sentencing disparity on the other.
III.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Let rne now address the second major criticis1n of ihe guideline system,
namely that judges have been robbed of all meaningful discretion, not just with
regard to the "prohibited factors" I have been discussing, but with regard to the
whole process, from begim1ing to end. 34 Picture if you will a pre-guidelines
sentencing proceeding. S\vathed in emline-or polyester, as the case may bethe judge looks down from the bench at the defendant and intones in an
imposing, stentorian voice, "I have heard the evidence and have decided that
you shall spend X years in the federal penitentiary." The X years, of course, was
any prison tem1 that fell between the statutory maximum and minimum for the
offense of conviction. The judge had that much discretion, and was subject to
essentially no appellate review."
Of course, the sentence imposed by the judge in the pre-guidelines era
was rarely the sentence that the defendant was actually going to serve. It was
the parole board that detennined the ultimate release date. The focus under this
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model was on rehabilitation; the idea was that the judge and the parole board
could accurately determine when a defendant had endured enough punishment
to emerge reformed. Penitentiaries existed to make their imnates penitent.

Corrections facilities theoretically prodliced "corrected" citizens. 36
This idea fell out of vogue, however, as people gradually lost faith in
the notion that a judge and a parole board could figure it all out. Rehabilitation
\Vas not an ignoble goal of punishment) but it \Vas difficult to achieve on such a
grand scale. We had quality jurists on the federal bench, but to demand such a

degree of foresight fron1 them \Vas unrealistic. So Congress sa\v the Sentencing
Reform Act as a \Vay to n1ove to a more realistic systetn, one that \vould
concentrate more on the other traditional goals of sentencing: retribution)
deterrence1 and incapacitation. 37
Consequently, under the sentencing guidelines, the parole board is out
of the picture entirely, and the judge has absolute control only over where to
sentence the defendant within the twenty-five percent parameters of the
applicable guideline range. Judicial discretion is clearly not what it used to be.
The question is whether this is a bad thing.
Many judges think so. This should not come as a surprise. 38 The
Sentencing Reform Act divested the bench of a power that not only was
essentially unchecked, but that had also been an exclusively judicial function for
hundreds of years. Judges were used to making sentencing decisions, and they
not unreasonably thought that they had a handle on this aspect of their jobs. It
might be hard to find a judge from the pre-guidelines era who didn't think that
he or she had the wisdom to decide what punishment a given defendant
deserved.
And maybe-if you take a charitable view of the federal bench-you
might believe that each and every pre-guidelines judge had a coherent, rational,
intemally consistent sentencing philosophy, so that a defendant who appeared
before the judge one \Veek could be reasonably assured of being sentenced
under the same criteria as the defendant \Vho had been there the \Veek before.
Maybe sentencing wasn't about what the judge had had for breakfast. So one
can readily understand why judges might resent being stripped of this authority.
But the concern behind the Sentencing Refonn Act was not that an
individual judge needed sentencing guidelines to keep hin1 or her from
sentencing two similar defendants in vastly different ways. The problem was
that a judge would sentence differently from the judge next door." In one
infamous study'° that sparked the sentencing reform movement, fifty district
judges from the Second Circuit \Vere given presentence reports frotn t\venty
actual cases, involving a representative range of offenses, and \Vere asked \Vhat
sentence they \Vould in1Pose in each. The results \Vere ren1arkable and
disturbing. Now, one might expect that the most severe sentence would differ
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greatly fron1 the least severe sentence, and that in fact occurred. 41 But even
toward the middle of the pack, the disparities were ovenvhelming: for many

cases, the hvelfth ntost severe sentence produced a prison tenn that \Vas hvo or
even three times the length of the twelfih least severe sentence. 42 In only four of
the twenty cases did the judges agree on whether the defendant should serve any

tin1e. 0 With no hint of overstatement, the report concluded that "absence of
consensus is the nom1." 44
Of course, no study can conclusively prove that such monstrous.
disparities are conunonplace. But Professor Bowman's examples of the Latino
credit card crook and the embezzling Anglo-Saxon banker illustrate how federal

judges can reasonably disagree significantly about \vhat a given defendant's
punislunent should be. And these examples, incidentally, only focused on the
defendants' backgrounds; they didn't even touch on the notion that different
judges would likely have different opinions regarding how much punishment
the criminal conduct itself merited. To use another example, one judge might

think that tnarijuana possession is no n1ore than a self.destructive vice deserving
of little govenllliental sanction. But the judge in the next courtroon1 might see
any involvement \Vith narcotics as a significant, blante\vorthy Jink. in the chain
of illegal drng networks that are a scourge of modem society. And although

neilher of these vie\vs is unconunon or unreasonable, they \VOuld probJtbly lead
to vastly different sentencing outco1nes.
Quite clearly, it perverts justice to have two defendants who committed
the same crime and who share the same background sentenced under different
criteria, with correspondiugly different results, merely because they end up
before different judges. Reducing this kind of disparity was, of course, one of
the central tenets of the sentencing reform effort that culminated in the
enactment of the guidelines. If you don't agree that this inter-judge disparity is

cause for concern, then there's no hope of converting you to 1ny cause, and you
should feel free to get up and head to the bar.
Excellent. A room full of potential converts. Every law professor's
dream. Still, the mere fact that sentencing disparity is a legitimate concern does
not tell us what we should do about it. It certainly doesn't mean that judges
should have no say in a defendant's sentence; even the most fanatic convert to
the disparity-avoidance theory must realize that judges have an important role to
play in the punislunent process.
So let me suggest that the sentencing guidelines offer a happy medium:
the guidelines prescribe a range of punishment, and the judge can choose any
sentence in that range. As I said before, this means that the judge basically
determines the last twenty-five percent of the sentence. To those who complain

about this lin1itation on judicial discretion, I paraphrase Professor Bo\vman and
ask why a judge's personal, unreviewable, unpredictable, and essentially secret
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views should ever control more than twenty-five percent of a defendant's fate."
Moreover, in many instances the court still retains control over
important aspects of the defendant's sentence. The court has considerable
discretion in setting the appropriate fine. 46 In the lo\ver ranges of the sentencing
table, the court tnay decide \Vhether to forego imprisorunent in favor of
probation, hotne detention, conununity confinernent, or sorne cotnbination
thereof. 47 Setting the tenns and conditions of probation and supervised release
is still very much in the bailiwick of the sentencing judge. 48
And, of course, the guidelines provide an escape hatch for the judge
who has good reason to believe that the prescribed sentencing range has failed
to account for the unique aspects of a particular case. If there is son1e
"aggravating or mitigating circurnstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration" by the guidelines, the judge may 11 depart, 11 that is to
say, choose a more appropriate sentencing range. 49 Although such a decision is
subject to revie\v, the Supreme Court's 1996 Koon decision 50 affim1ed the
sentencing judge's unique position to rnake such a determination: nA district
court's decision to depart from the Guidelines ... \Viii in most cases be due
substantial deference, for it e1nbodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a
sentencing court."51
"Fine," you rnay say. "Let's pretend you've convinced 1ne that the
1in1itations on judicial discretion aren't con1pletely ill~founded. But the
Sentencing Refonn Act didn't just take discretion away from judges and give it
to the Sentencing Commission; it gave it to prosecutors." This is a conunon
criticism of the guidelines," and it is not without some justification. Under the
guidelines, prosecutors do have more influence over sentencing-relative to
judges at least. But on close examination, it appears that the prosecutor really
only has significant control over three aspects of the sentencing process. Let's
examine them in tum.
First, the prosecutor can decide not to bring certain charges, or to
dismiss charges that have already been brought. TI1is point is not really a
criticism of the guideline system, ho\vever, because the prosecutors have ahvays
had this power (and have always used it to control the plea-bargaining and
sentencing process). 53 Furthennore, the guidelines anticipate charge-based
disparities and have a built-in response to this problem. That built-in defense is
called "modified real-offense sentencing," which essentially means that the
guidelines look beyond the count of conviction to what the defendant act11ally
did." So if a prosecutor pleads a drng dealer down to a "sale of paraphernalia"
charge, the guidelines will still treat that defendant as a dmg dealer-subject of
course to the statutory maxinrnm sentence for the paraphemalia charge and
contingent on proof at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was actually
dealing dmgs." Accordingly, the prosecutor's ability to influence sentencing by
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manipulating charges can hardly be said to have increased under the guidelines;
the opposite may in fact be true, since the guidelines for the first time require
the court to consider what the defendant actually did even, in dismissed or
uncharged conduct.
The second \Vay in \vhich the prosecutor influences sentencing is in his
or her role as \Vhat Professor Bo,vman calls "master of the facts. " 56 What this
means is that the prosecutor, by choosing not to reveal certain evidence to the
court, can influence the factual findings that go into 1naking sentencing
detenninations. Now, historically the prosecutor has always had a lot of control
over \vhat facts \Vere presented to the court but this control takes on increased
itnportance under the guidelines, 'vhcre the relationship behveen the facts of a
case and the sentencing outconte is more direct and predictable than it \vas in the
pre-guidelines era. But there are significant limitations on this power as well,
First, the judge is no naive outsider. Having sat through the
defendant's trial, the court already knows a lot about the facts of the case. And
at sentencing the judge is the one \Vho decides \Vhat evidence is credible and
\Vhat evidence isn'f. 57 Second, there's the probation officer \Vho prepares the
presentence report. 111is is done in cooperation \Vith the prosecution, but
probation officers can and do provide an important perspective that helps judges
decide whether they've got the full picture.'' Third, the defendant and his or her
attorney are not going to sit idly by and let the prosecutor run the show; we can
count on then1 to present evidence of any mitigating circumstances. FinalJy, as
an attomey and representative of the people the prosecutor is subject to
considerable ethical constraints \Vhen it cornes to concealing relevant evidence. 59
So when all is said and done, the prosecutor's control of the facts falls
well short of being a reliable way of circumventing the correct outcome under
the guidelines. There is one area, however, in \Vhich the prosecutor's po\ver
may have too few limits, and that is in seeking departures for "substantial
assistance." Under the guidelines, if a defendant aids authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of another offense, he or she rnay be entitled to a
lower sentence-but only if the prosecution makes a motion to that effect. 60 The
defense 1nay not request such a departure, nor can the court grant one sua
1

sponte. 61

The govenunent, of course is in the best position to detennine \vhether
the defendant has really cooperated, but the statistics on the use of this
prerogative cast doubt on whether it is really doing what it's supposed to do. In
the late 1980s, substantial assistance departures were used in less than eight
percent of all cases. 62 That number has steadily gro\vn; last year ahuost one in
five defendants received a departure for substantial assistance." Obviously, this
progression is not due lo some gradual realization by prosecutors that
defendants might know something about other crimes. Rather, prosecutors
1
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appreciate that their power to move for a substantial assistance departure is a
useful bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process. And courts have
acquiesced in this scheme by granting the motions-especially since judges
often have even less desire than the prosecution to see these cases go to trial. In
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in recent years, almost fifty percent of
defendants have received this bonus." Perhaps Philadelphia is a city of
exceptionally \Vell infonned rats, but at the very least its substantial assistance
rate gives ne\v n1eaning to the tenn brotherly love."
I would guess that relatively few of these cases involve much in the
\Vay of useful infon11ation fron1 the defendant; the prosecution is just cutting the
defense a sweet deal to get a conviction without going before a jury. And the
deal can indeed be sweet. Some of you may have heard of the case of Alan
Eagleson, an National Hockey League Hall of Farner who recently pleaded
guilty to three counts of mail fraud related to his shady dealings as a sports
agent and union head." He had been accused of stealing millions and was
indicted on thirty-six counts of Jabor fraud, racketeering, en1bezzlement
obstn1ction of justice, and so on. 66 His three counts of conviction \vould have
resulted in a guideline sentence of approximately four years, 67 but the
prosecution gave him a substantial assistance departure and he got only
probation."
No\v Mr. Eagleson s case n1ay have been special-it involved
Canadian charges as \veH69-and he n1ay \Veil have helped the prosecution a
great deal. I use this example merely to point out how great these sentence
reductions can be, and therefore ho'v te1npting it is for prosecutors to use them
when they want a concession from the defense. This is sotnetitnes a regrettable
aspect of the sentencing guidelines system, and I believe it is the source of many
of the criticisms directed at prosecutorial power under the Sentencing Reform
Act. But I do find it interesting that the prosecution's ability to seek substantial
assistance departures, like its ability to conceal aggravating facts fron1 the court,
has only a lowering effect on sentences. 70
So all this hubbub about increased prosecutorial power is really about
power that is only useful to lower sentences from what they would otherwise be.
If the Cotn1nission could figure out a \Vay to limit this prosecutorial discretion
then, the result would probably be higher sentences. Is this what the critics of
the guidelines want? I am sure it's not. 11 In fact, the third major criticism of the
guidelines, to which I will now tum, is that they produce overly severe
sentences. If this is true, then 1naybe n1y cynicism regarding the sentence~
lowering machinations in which prosecutors engage is misplaced. Maybe
they're not simply trying to avoid a trial; maybe they're trying to reach a inore
equitable result. And maybe the complaints about loss of judicial discretion
would not be so shrill if the sentences that the guidelines produced were not as
11

1

1

1
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high.
IV,

SENTENCE LENGTH

So are sentences too long under the guidelines? Yes and no. Or maybe
I should put it this way: no, except in one area-drugs. Many drug sentences
are admittedly too high, but these sentences usually reflect what Congress has
done independently of the Connnission. I refer, of course, to the mandatory
minimurn penalties for dn1g trafficking.
Mandatory minimum penalties represent exactly \Vhat the guidelines
are 110/ all about. They focus on just one isolated aspect of the defendant's
conduct, to the exclusion of all other considerations. In the dmg statutes, that
one factor is the quantity of dmgs involved in the offense. 12 A guidelines
system, on the other hand, is designed to weigh the good against the bad, and
not let any one aspect of the case ovenvhelm all other relevant sentencing

considerations.
And to the Commission's credit, it has consistently opposed the use of
mandatory minimums in general and unduly harsh dmg statutes in particular. In
1991 the Commission submitted a report to Congress that roundly criticized the
concept ofn1andatory minin1un1s. 73 And in 1995 the Conunission unanimously
crilicized the infa1nous 100:1 crack·to·pO\vder quantity ratio under which
dealing ten grams of crack cocaine is punished the same as dealing a kilo of
po\vder cocaine. 74 Unfortunately) Congress didn't take the Conunission up on

either initiative. 7.s
Indeed, if we didn't have the guidelines, judges would probably be
dealing with more of these mandatory minimum statutes; if Congress is willing
to enact such provisions in the face of the federal guideline system we already
have in place, imagine what Congress might do absent such a system. The
tetnptation to fill that vacuum \Vith even more statutory sentencing
enhancements would probably be overwhelming. Opponents of the guidelines
should be careful of what they ask for-they might get it. And a whole lot
tnore. 76
As for non-drug sentences, there are good reasons for their severity.
The original Commissioners drafted the guidelines in the late 1980s with a
certain vie\V a~ to the role of'fcdcral la\v enforcement. We've aii heard the
pluase, 11 Don 1 t 1nake a federal case out of.it."77 It irnplies, of course, that federal
jurisdiction over criminal inatters should be reserved for critnes more serious
than your mn-of-the-mill case. So if a bank fraud is serious enough to warrant
attention from the feds, then it probably deserves more punishment than the guy
011 the corner who tries to sell you a fake Rolex watch (spelled with two "L"s).
Federal sentences should be tough because the feds aren't-or at least shouldn't
be-wasting their time with small fry. 78
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Further, once we set aside the Congressionally mandated drng
sentences (drngs, by the way, account for about forty percent of all federal
cases"), the guidelines' punishment levels just aren't that high. In fact, drngs
aside, the Commission most often hears complaints from the public about
sentences being too low. This is especially trne for white collar offenses and

critnes of violence. In my vie\v, then, the source of the general discontent about
sentence length is the same as the source of the discontent about limited judicial
discretion: some drug sentences are too high, This is unfortunately sometin1es
trne, but it has little to do with the Sentencing Reform Act, the Sentencing

Guidelines, or the Sentencing Conunission.
V,

COMPLEXITY

Now to the last major criticism of the guidelines: they're too hard to

understand. 80
understanding.
vac11u111.

Before I get into this one, I

\Yant

to reinforce one basic

We're talking about a system of guidelines that replaced a

That is to say, there \Vas nothing governing sentencing decisions in the

pre-guidelines era except for the general, toothless limitation that the sentence
could not be illegal, which basically meant that the judge had to choose a

sentence \Vithin the statutory 1ninin1um and rnaximurn, 81 .

So the movement to a sentencing guidelines system \Vas clearly going
to result in relatively increased complexity. This may seem obvious, but a 1996
Washington Post series critical of the guidelines began by asserting that "[a]
system incant to simplify the punislunents nleted out for particular crin1es has
tnade then1 more con1plicated .... "82 It continued, "A systen1 nleant to

streamline the sentencing process instead has clogged the courts \vith appeals
83
••• ,"
No\v, I don't kno\V \vhere the Post \Vas getting its infonnation, but
anyone who thinks that going from a system of unlimited discretion and no
accountability to a strnctured, uniform framework of universally applicable
legal mies will simplify or streamline anything is just not the swiftest pony in
the corral. I mean, you can't gel any simpler or more streamlined than the preguidelines system. Tiiat was the whole problem.
So the question is-assuming for the moment that the idea of a

sentencing guidelines sys tern is an acceptable one-is \Vhat , \Ve have too
complicated? Well, what do we have? We have a book, a guidelines manual.

Nice friendly fonnat, big fonts. Lots of \Vhite space. Look here, these t\vo
pages are almost completely devoid of text!" And this one is completely
blank!" Try finding that in a bankmptcy manual or the internal revenue code.

Any\vay, the substantive portion of the manual is about four hundred
pages long. (The rest is composed of appendices and other reference material
that make the substantive portion easier to understand, rather than more
complicated.) Frankly, that ain't bad, considering that we have over nine

12

hundred different federal offenses to cover. 86 The federal criminal code, \vhich
to an extent dictates the degree of complexity of the guidelines, is hardly a
model of clarity. And, of course, only a small fraction of the manual's pages are
consulted in a given case. If you don't violate the tenns of your probation or
supervised release, you're never going to see Chapter Seven. If you're not an
organization, Chapter Eight is out. I'm an1azed at ho\v slim this thing is, con1e
to think of it.
I'm kidding, of course, but so many critics of the guidelines point to
the length of the manual and then instantly conclude, without any further
evidence, that the system is just way too complicated. As anyone who has
practiced under the guidelines will acknowledge, however, it's nothing like
ERISA or any of the other more arcane areas of the law. It's just not that hard.
The complaints from practitioners about the complexity of the guidelines are
really just the griping of those who preferred the old system, where sentencing
was a crap-shoot and there were no standards to speak of.87
And I should point out that the Commission has an extensive training
staff that flies all over the country helping judges, probation officers, and
attorneys learn how to deal with the guidelines. The same staff also maintains a
help line that anyone can call \Vith questions about guideline application. And,
frotn 'vhat I understand, the Conunission staff has a much better record than
those folks \vho ans\ver questions over at the IRS.
We must also recognize that the Sentencing Refom1 Act de1nands a
certain level of complexity from the guidelines. As I mentioned before, all the
guideline calcnlations eventually lead you to the sentencing table, on which the
Y axis represents the seriousness of the defendant's offense and the X axis
represents the defendant's criminal record." The 'y axis has forty-three
different levels, and the X axis has six." That's two hundred and fifty-eight
different cells containing sentencing ranges. It certainly looks pretty complex,
especially if you've seen some state sentencing guideline tables, (Mirmesota's
table, for instance, only has seventy cells.'')
But the Sentencing Reform Act put two restrictions on the Commission
that made a table of this complexity pretty much unavoidable, First, as I
mentioned before, the top of each sentencing range can be no more than twentyfive percent greater than the bottom." So if the bottom of a range is, say, forty
months, the top of the range can't be more than fifty months, A range that starts
at one hundred months can't end higher than one hundred twenty-five months.
You get the idea. (See? This stuff isn't that tough,)
Second, the Sentencing Refonn Act required that the table top out at
about thirty years, because that was the point at which the Act allowed the
Comn1ission to authorize a life sentence.92 So it \Vas the combination of these
two factors (plus some minor, reasonable policy decisions by the original
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Conunission") that led lo such a detailed table: the Conunission had to use
fairly small ranges, and it had·to use them all the way up to the thirty-year mark.
That meant a lot of cells. And, of course, once the Conunission had all
those cells, it had to come up with some way to distinguish them from one
another. You can't have hvo hundred and fifty-eight cells and just one or hvo

factors to consider per case.
All this technical stuff aside, there's one aspect of the complexity

criticism that I have yet to address, and it's the rnost \Vorrisome aspect. La,vyers
may be able to understand the guidelines without too much trouble, but can
defendants understand what's happening to them? Calculating which of the two
hundred and fifty-eight cells a defendant falls into involves some numbercrunching, and there is a danger that defendants could get overwhelmed by all
the math and lose the sense that there's any underlying justice in the process."
On the other hand, I do think that in most cases a defense attorney cau
usually sit down with his or her client and explain the process in plain English in
half an hour or less. The typical presentence report section that contains the
sentencing calculations is usually just a fe\v pages, and it's not that hard to
understand. "Well, Jack, take a look at this guideline: You robbed a bank, so
you start with twenty-two points." You had a gun on you, so that's another
five. 96 You look off with $100,000 and a bank guard in tow; that's another six."
But you've accepted responsibility for what you did, and you cooperated
some\vhat \Vith authorities after you were caught, so that's three points off. 98
That gives you a total Offense Level of 30. Your two prior thefts and one
assault put you in Criminal History category Ill.99 So, on this table you can see
that an Offense Level of30 and Criminal History category Ill mean that you'll
get between 121and151 months." 100
No,v, that's not that bad, is it? You may think it sounds too clinical,
but it's certainly not nearly as inscrutable as critics make it out to be. Of course,
I'd like to do even better than that; I would like to see the guidelines simplified
to a point at which defendants could understand them just by picking up the
manual and paging through it. 1 In fact, I've been a major proponent of the
Commission's simplification project.
Bui there's no easy way to get from here to there, and so I console
myself once again by comparing the present state of things with what came
before. In the pre-guidelines era, a bank robbery defendant, who used a gun,
wotild appear for sentencing knowing only that he or she could gel anywhere

'°

front probation to 25 years. 102 At best, the court \vould recite a litany of criteria
that it had considered in setting the punishment and would then announce the
result, the final sentence. The defendant might even think that this wasn't a bad
method, that the judge had mentioned some reasonable stuff-until the
defendant n1et a fellow inmate \Vho had conunitted exactly the sarne critne and
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was only serving half the time.
At worst, a pre-guidelines sentencing would not even seem to follow
any logical sentencing calculus. As Professor Bo\vman says, If there is one
spectacle Jess illuminating [to a defendant] than the intricacies of a guidelines
argument, it is that of a judge in an indeterminate sentencing system sitting in
sphinx-like silence through a sentencing and then proclain1ing, 'In consideration
of all the factors presented before me today, I sentence you to [25 years]. Thank
you. We \Viii be in recess. "' 103 In such a case, the defendant might not \Yonder
what all the math was about, but would nevertheless probably lose faith in the
system right there in the courtroom.
So when I lament the complexity and potential for confusion that
sometimes mar the guidelines system, I stop and think about what result I would
prefer: a defendant bowled over by numbers, who needs a lawyer to explain
\Vhat it's all about, or a defendant \Vho, upon hearing the sentence, turns to his
lawyer and asks why he got so much time, only to be met with a blank stare, a
shrng, and a "I dunno. Judge musta had indigestion this morning." I'll take the
math anytime.
And finally, even if the defendant's eyes glaze over throughout the
whole process, and he or she never really understands what happened, I am
11

son1e,vhat comforted by the idea that at least there

lvas

a process at 1vork. 104

When the state deprives someone of liberty, the need for a regimented,
procedurally sound, reviewable process is at its highest. 105 Maybe there were

tin1es \Vhen pre-guideline sentencing see111ed more comprehensible to
defendants, but hidden behind the judge's explanation was at best a rationale
that could be totally different from that of the judge next door, and at worst
subconscious, insidious inconsistencies and biases.
VI.

VISIBILITY

This brings me to my final point. It's not a response to any of the four
criticis1ns I have been discussing. Rather, it's a unique and important advantage
of the guidelines system, one that I think would convince even the guidelines'
most rabid critic that at least ~omething good has come of the Sentencing
Reform Act. And that is that the system is visible. The pre-guidelines
sentencing system-to the extent that there was anything that could properly be
called a system-was entirely invisible. No one knew what was going into a
given sentencing decision.
But no\v \Ve have a wealth of information about sentencing practices,
and \VC have opened vast ne\v areas of criminal justice to empirical analysis. In
a big roorn at lhe Senlencing Cornmission, lhere are dozens of dala extractors
who do nothing all day except sit there and code every case that is decided
under the guidelines. That means that for each of the almost 50,000 sentencings
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that occur in the federal courts each year, 106 the Conunission collects a pool of
variables !hat explain ho\v the sentence came to be, This database is publicly

available to anyone \Vho wants to use it, aQ.d many people do. 107
So it's no \vonder that there are so many criticis1ns of the guidelines:
there's so tnuch to see. And \Vhenever a valid criticism is 1nade, I find
consolation by thinking, "Hey, at leas! we can see the problem. We don'! have

to speculate."
And, of course, once we have identified a problem, a corollary
advantage of the system comes 10 light: we can fix ii in the traditional, public,

den1ocratic fashion. The process is no\V quasi-legislative. For instance, the
crack/po\vder sentencing probletn is something that everyone can see, thanks to
!he now-visible nature of sentencing and lo the data collection efforts of !he
Conunission. And once a problem like that has been docurnented, solving it
becomes a matter of the political process and political will. 1°' Now, I'd be !he
first lo admit Iha! the polilical process may not be !he mos! rational system in
!he world. But compare it to the stale of things in !he pre-guidelines era, where

racial disparity in a. single judge's sentencing practices-or in the syste1n
overall-\vas very difficult to track in any co1nprehensive, rneaningful \Vay and
would have been impossible lo correct
VII,

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, despite the danger that our mathematically challenged
legal profession might screw up !he numbers, I'm glad Iha! we have federal
sentencing guidelines. They appropriately cabin judicial discretion without
destroying ii. They trade simplicity for consistency, and come out ahead. And
!he problems !hat do exist, such as some overly harsh drug sentences, can be

identified and re1nedied much 1nore readily than was the case in the preguidelines era.
I am no! alone in my affection. Allhough the guideline system could
hardly have been called popular when ii was first instituted, things have changed

some\vhat over the ten years that it's been in place. Back then, over hvo
hundred district judges invalidated the guidelines and all or part of !he
Sentencing Reform Act 109-unlil the Supreme Court upheld !he whole kil and
caboodle.in the 1989 Mistretta case. 110 Bui more and more we see judges and
practitioners whose only sentencing experiences have been under the guidelines,
and who are more accepting of the system.
In fact, the Federal Judicial Center recenlly surveyed all federal district
judges'" and asked them, among other things, what they !hough! about the

fain1ess of the major guidelines· areas, Jike dn1gs, fraud, inunigration, et cetera.
The responses were done on a scale of one to five, \vhere one was too lenient,
five was loo harsh, and three was just right, All twelve areas surveyed clustered
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around the "just right" mark with the average score for all the areas combined
being 3.03. 112 So judges may have problems with the guidelines system, but its
overall fairness is apparently not among them.
Finally, I think the guidelines embody an important concept, one
mentioned in Judge Dalzell's article: that ours is "a government of laws, not
men." 113 There is no rnore momentous an interaction of the state and the
individual than when the matter of that individual's liberty is being decided. At
that point, then, it is not only appropriate but essential that the standards at play
are consistent, just} and amenable to the democratic process. Ho\vever
imperfectly, the sentencing guidelines look to that ideal, and they do so more
faithfully than the system that came before.
For these reasons, Judge Dalzell has wisely concluded that Churchill's
adage about democracy probably applies with equal vigor to the federal
guideline system: It is the worst possible way to sentence a defendant, except
for all the others. 114
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Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, the severity of a federal sentence \Vas
unrevie\vable, as long as the sentence fell \Vithin the 1ninitnum and 111axin1un1
tenns set forth in the criminal code. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424, 431 (1974) ("[O]nce it is detennined that a sentence is within the
limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is
at ati end."); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("[A] sentence
imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not
subject to revie\v.").
'See, e.g., Kevin Clancy et al., Se11te11ce Decisio11111aki11g: The Logic o/Se11te11ce
Decisio11s a11d the Exte11t a11d Sources o/Se11te11ce Disparity, 72 J, CRJM. L &
CRJMINOLOGY 524 (1981); ANTHONY PARTRJDGE& WILLIAM B. ELDRJDGE,
THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY ( 1974).
'Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. Il, ch. Il, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1987 (1984).
'See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Se11te11ci11g G1iideli11es a11d the Key
Compromises Upo11 Which They Rest, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. I, 3 (1988); see also
Sentencing Refom1 Act,§ 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 1990
(directing the sentencing court to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records \Vho have been
found guilty of similar conduct") (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1998)); S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983) ("A primary goal of sentencing reform is the
elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity."), repri11ted i11 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235; id. at 56 ("Under the [Sentencing Refonn Act], the
sentence imposed by the judge will be the sentence actually served .... The
prisoner, the public, and the corrections officials will be certain at all times how
long the prison term will be .... "), repri11ted i11 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3239.
'For example, in fiscal year 1986, before the federal sentencing guidelines went
into effect, the Federal Bureau of Prisons released 4,657 prisoners on parole.
The average parolee had served just 34.9% of his or her original sentence. FED.
BUREAU OF PRJSONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 1986 tab. C-2 (1986).
'See Sentencing Reform Act,§ 217(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 2017-26
(creating the U.S. Sentencing Conunission); id., 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at
2020 (directing the Commission to consider, i11ter alia, "the circumstances
under \Vhich the offense \Vas comn1itted, the nature and degree of harm caused
1111
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by the offense," and the defendant's "criminal history") (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 994(c)(2)-(3), (d)(!O)).

'See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.).
'Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., FEB. 11,
1992, at 2; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning lo Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 680 (agreeing with Judge Cabranes that
"[ o)ne can hardly overstate the significance of the Guidelines").
9

See Cabranes, supra note 8, at 2.

"See Albert A. Alschuler, The Failure ofSentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Judy Clarke, The Se11/e11ci11g
Guidelines: Whal a Mess, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 45; Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits 011 the
Discretion ofSentencers, 101 YALB L.J. 1681 (1992); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
The Death of Discretion? Rej/ectio11s 011 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988); Michael Tomy, The Failure of the U.S.
Se/l/encing Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRJME & DELINQ. 131 (1993); Gerald
F. Uelman, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29
AM. CRJM. L. REV. 899 (1992); David Yellen, Just Deserts and Leniellf
Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-Offense Sentencing, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1434 (1997).
"See, e.g., Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged,
Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote
Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 835, 850 (1993) ("the
controversial Federal Sentencing Guidelines"); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John
Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal
Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1117 (1995) ("[T]he Sentencing
Guidelines continue to be the n1ost controversial area of federal criminal la\v. ll);
Gregory W. O'Reilly & Robert Drizin, United Stales v. Lopez: Reinvigorating
the Federal Balance by Maintaining the States' Role as the "Immediate and
Visible Guardians" ofSecurity, 22 J. LEGJS. 1, 8 (1996) ("controversial
experiments like the federal sentencing guidelines"); Stephanie C. Slatkin, Note,
The Standard of Proof al Sentencing Hearings Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Why the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Is

19

Constll11tionally lnadeq11ate, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 583 ("the complex and
controversial federal sentencing gnidelines").
12 Bo\v1nan supra note 8.
1

"Stewart Dalzell, One Cheer/or the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L. REV. 317 (1995).

"See, e.g., Clarke, s11pra note 10, at 45; Freed, s11pra note IO, at 1715-18;
Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1954-55; Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. I, 3 ( 1987).
Cj Bowman, s11pra note 8, at 704 ("The first and most commonly heard
complaint about the Guidelines is that they are mechanistic, soulless, and
inhuman.").
15

See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 926; Freed, supra note 10, at 1697;
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 190-200 (1991).

"See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines
Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 772-72 (1992); Stephan J. Schulhofer,
Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem ls Uniformity, Not
Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1992); Weinstein, supra note 14, at
3.
"See. e.g., Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencing Reform: The
Legislative Hist01y of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 287, 290 (1993); Uelman, supra note IO, at 902; Stanley A. Weigel,
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA. L. REV.
83, 99 (1988).
"See sources cited supra note 14.
"See U.S.S.G. §§ 5Hl.l-.6, .11-.12.
'°Bowman, supra note 8, at 707-08.
21

/d. at 707.

"Id. at 707-08.
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"Id. at 708,
"Cf. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41 (1983) ("One judge may impose a relatively long

prison term to rehabilitate or incapacitate the offender. Another judge, under
similar circumstances, may sentence the defendant to a shorter prison term
simply to punish him, or the judge may opt for the imposition of a tem1 of
probation in order to rehabilitate him."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3224.
15See

Bowman, supra note 8, at 708 ("The real problem is that all of the
arguments I have placed in the mouths of the defenders and prosecutors of my
hypothetical defendants are 'true.'"), 710 ("Indeed, the flaw lies in the very
notion of a right sentence. 111) .
1

"See, e.g., Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, Burnout: Age at Release ji'o111
Prison and Recidivis111., 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 617 (1984); David A. Pritchard,
Stable Predictors ofRecidivis111: A Sum111my, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1979).
"See David Weisburd et al., Specific Deterrence in a Sa111ple of Offenders
Convicted of White-Collar Crimes, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 587 (1995) (finding that
imprisomnent does not have a specific deterrent impact on likelihood ofwhitecollar criminal recidivism); Kenneth Marni et al., Se11te11ci11g the White Collar
Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479, 483-86 (1980) (discussing judges' views
on disapprobation); Richard A. Posner, Opti111al Sentences for White-Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 416-17 & n.24-25 (1980) (discussing
social stigma associated with conviction).
"See Dalzell, supra note 13, at 332.
"See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995).
'°See U.S.S.O. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
31

There are f\VO exceptions to this "T\venty-Five Percent Rule": each range can
span a minimurn of six 1nonths, and a range \Vith a minimum of thirty years or
more may have a maximum oflife imprisomnent. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)
("If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisomnent, the
maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the
minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months,
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except that, if the minimum tenn of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum
may be life imprisonment.").
"If the range spans more than twenty-four months, the judge must state his or

her reasons for choosing the particular point in the range. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(I).
"Bowman, supra note 8, at 714; see generally id. at 712-13.
4

J

See sources cited supra note 15.

"See Dorszynski v. United Stales, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("[O]nce ii is
detennined that a sentence is \Vithin the limitations set forth in the statute under
which it is imposed, appellate review is al an end."); United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("[A] sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if
within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review."),
36
0r, as Professor Bo\vn1an states, 11Penitentiaries \Vould inspire penance and
refom1atories \VO\lld refom1. 11 Bowman, supra note 8, at 685.

37Even under the Sentencing Refonn Act, rehabilitation ren1ains one of the

purposes of sentencing. See Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, tit. II, ch. II,§ 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Slat.) 1987, 1989 (1984)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 76
(1983) ("111e committee does not suggest that efforts to rehabilitate prisoners
should be abandoned."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. But
Congress clearly sought to remove rehabilitation from its lofty status and focus
on the other purposes. See id. at 38 ("In the federal system today, criminal
sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation model. ... [I]t is now
quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is
rehabilitated."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221; id. at 40 ("Recent
studies suggest that [rehabilitation] has failed, and most sentencing judges as
well as the Parole Commission agree that the rehabilitation model is not an
appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know too little about human
behavior lo be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to
detennine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been
rehabilitated.") (fooh1otes omitted), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223;
Sentencing Refonn Act,§ 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 1998
TI1e court, in detem1ining \Vhether to in1pose a tenn of imprisonment and, if a
tenn of imprisonment is lo be imposed, in determining the length of the lenn,
(

11

1

22

shall ... recog1iiz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.") (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)); id.
§ 217(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 2022 ("The Commission shall insure
that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a tem1
ofimprisotunent for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant .... ") (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)); id.§ 217(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 2023
("Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary
and compelling reason [for sentence reduction].") (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(s)).
"See Bowman, supra note 8, at 725 (noting that limitation of judicial discretion
was the Sentencing Reform Act's principal purpose).
"See id. at 686-87.
'°PARTRIDGE & ELDRIDGE,
41

Id. tab. I.

42

/d. at 9 & tab. I.

supra note 2.

"Id. at 10.
"Id.
45

Professor Bo\vn1an puts it this way: "The question Judge Cabranes and other
guideline critics must answer is why the idiosyncratic judgments of a randomly
selected judicial officer should ever control more than 25% of the sentence of
any criminal defendant." Bo\Vman, supra note 8, at 713.
"See U.S.S.G. § 5Bl.2.
41

See id.§§ 5Bl.1-.2, 5Cl.1, 5Fl.l-.3.

48

See id.§§ 5Bl.3, 5Dl.1-.3, 5Fl.5.

"See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.

"Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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"Id. at 98; see also Bowman, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing departure
authority as mitigating guidelines' limitation on judicial discretion).
"See, e.g., David Boemer, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion,
78 JUDICATURE 196 (1995); Freed, supra note 10, at 1723-24; Heaney, supra
note 15, at 190-200. But see James B. Bums et al., We Make the Beller Target
(But the Guidelines Shifted Powerfi'om the Judicimy to Congress, Not fi'om the
Judicimy to the Prosecuti011), 91 Nw. L. REv. 1317 (1997).
"See Stuart Nagel & Kathleen Levy, The Average May Be the Optimum ill
Determi11ate Se11te11cing, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 622-23 (l 981) (discussing
prosecution's pre-guidelines power in plea-bargaining and sentencing process);
Louis B. Schwartz, Optio11s in Constructing A Sentencing System: Sentencing
Guidelines Under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 684686 (1981) (same); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning up the Chicken Coop of
Se111e11cing Uniformity: Guiding The Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through
The Use of The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L, REV.
1267, 1271 (1997) (same).
"See U.S.S.G. ch l, pt. A, at 5-6 (explaining how the Commission came to
adopt this approach). The guidelines themselves no longer use the words
"modified real-offense"; the term was deleted in 1990. See U.S,S.G. app. C, at
122, 126 (amendment 307). The term has nevertheless endured as a catchphrase
for the guidelines' "relevant conduct" principle, embodied in U.S.S.G. § IBI.3.
See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, !11 Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines'
Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U, L. REV. 1342 ( 1997). For an
explanation of this principle by Conu11ission insiders, see Williarn W. Wilkins,
Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Comers tone of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 497-503 (1990). Cf Bowman,
supra note 8, at 703 ("[T]he essence of the [relevant conduct] concept is that the
court can, indeed must, sentence each defendant based on what he really did as
part of the same transaction or series of related transactions that resulted in the
count of conviction, regardless of the specific offense of which a defendant is
convicted after trial or as a result of a plea").
"Our hypothetical dmg dealer who pleads to a sale of paraphernalia charge
under 21 U.S.C. § 863 would be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.7. If the dmg
dealing fell within his or her "relevant conduct," as defined by § 1B l.3, then the
cross-reference in§ 2Dl.7(b)(I) would apply and the defendant would be
sentenced under§ 2Dl.l, just like any other drng dealer.
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j

6

Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 726.

"See id. at 718.

"Professor Bowman characterizes the involvement of the probation officer as
"possibly the greatest institutional constraint on unbridled manipulation of the
facts by the parties [at sentencing]." Id. at 730.
"See. e.g., U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL§ 9-27.400, .430,
.710; Bo\vrnan, supra note 8, at 727-28.
"'See U.S.S.G. §SKI.I.
"See Wade v. United Stales, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that court
may revie\v prosecutor's decision not to move for substantial assistance
departure only if based on unconstitutional motive or not rationally related lo
any legitimate Govemment end).

"For example, in 1989 the substantial assistance departure rate was 7.5%. U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1990 lab. C-5 (1990).
"The substantial assistance departure rate in fiscal year 1997 was 19.2%. U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 51 (1997).
"In fiscal year 1996, 47.5% of all defendants in the Eastem District received a
substantial assistance departure. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1996
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B ( 1996). The next
year, the figure dropped to 41.8%. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note
63, app. B.
"See Ex-NHL Union Head Enters Guilty Plea in Mail-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J.,
January 7, 1998, at B16.
66

See The Fall of R. Alan Eagleson, GLOBE & MAIL{Toronto), January 7, 1998,
at S3.

"The U.S. Attomey in the case thought that Eagleson could get anywhere from
tluee lo ten years. See Sean Fine et al., The Bargain, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
January 7, 1998, at Al. Tiie judge calculated a guideline range of forty-one to
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fifty-one months. See Ex-U11io11 Chief Eagleson Guilty ofMail Fraud, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, January 7, 1998, at 9C.

"See Ex-NHL U11io11 Head, s11pra note 65, at Bl6.
"Eagleson's plea agreement involved extradition from Canada and resolution of
criminal charges there as well. See Fine et al., s11pra note 67, at A I.
Nevertheless, in the end he ended up serving only six months in Canadian
prison. See Eagleson Leaves Jail, Can't Avoid Spotlight, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), July 8, 1998, at A3.
70

See Bo\'ttnan, supra note 8, at 726.

71 Professor Bo\Vtnan \Vanis guidelines critics to "be careful what you \Vish for
because you might get it." Id. at 732.
12

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l).

"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRJMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33-34 ( 1991 ).
"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 195-200.

"See Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (!09 Stat.)
334 (disapproving ofConunission effort to eliminate crack/powder disparity).
"See s11pra note 71.
71

Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 739.

"See id. at 739.
"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 63, fig. A, at l l.
sosee sources cited supra note 17.
81

The only valid challenges to a sentence within the statutory range were based
on a deficiency in the sentencing process. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443 (1972) (holding that sentencing judge's ignorance of
unconstitutionality oft\vo prQvious convictions warranted reconsideration of
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sentence).
"Mary Pat Flaherty and Joan Biskupic, Despite Overhaul, Federal Sentencing
Still Misfires, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at A 1.
"Id.

"U.S.S.G. at 38-39.
"Id. at 258.

"The statutory index to the guidelines lists well over 900 separate offenses. See
id. app. A. Tiiere are countless others that are not listed; the federal code
contains some 3,600 provisions that carry criminal sanctions. See Robert H.
Joos!, Federal Criminal Code Reform: ls ft Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. LAW REV.
195, 198 (1997). Note, however, that infractions and Class Band C
misdemeanors do not fall within the sentencing guidelines' coverage. See
U.S.S,G. § lBl.9.
87Professor Bo,vn1an calls it "pro fonna bellyaching." Bo\'tn1an, supra note 8, at
705.

"See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
"Id.

'°MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 45 ( 1998).

"See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). There is actually a limitation of this "Twenty-Five
Percent Rule" for the smaller sentencing ranges: "If a sentence specified by the
guidelines includes a tenn of imprisonment, the n1axilnum of the range
established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more
than the greater of25 percent or 6 months ... ," Id. (emphasis added). Note
that the Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United
States is of the opinion that the Twenty-Five Percent Rule is not as confining as
the Commission believes. See Catherine M. Goodwin, Background of the AO
Memorandum Opinion on the 25% Rule, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 109 (1995);
Memorandum Opinion ofthe General Counsel's Office, Administrative Office of
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United States Courts, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 110 (1995).
"See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) ("!fa sentence specified by the guidelines includes
a tenn of imprisoounent, the maximum of the range established for such a term
shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25
percent or 6 tnonths, except that, if the 111i11i1nu111 ternz of the range is 30 years or
more, the maximum may be life i111priso11111e11t.") (emphasis added).
"TI1ese included the decision to allow the coverage of adjacent guideline ranges
to overlap, so that the high point of a given guideline range is the midpoint of
the next range and the low point of the next after that. For example, in Criminal
History Category l, an Offense Level of 16 produces a range of 21 to 27
months. Offense Level 18, two levels higher, has a range of27 to 33 months.
See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). This overlap does increase the
number of cells in the table, but in doing so it allows the court to defuse debates
about one- or hvo-Jevel sentencing factors by pointing out that it can itnpose the
satne sentence regardless of \Vhether the factor is applied.
94

See Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 706.

"See U.S.S.G. § 5B3.l(a), (b)(l).
"See id. § 5B3. l(b)(2)(E).
"See id.§ 5B3.l(b)(4)(A), (b)(7)(C).
"See id.§ 3El.l(a), (b).
99Assuming that Jack served more than sixty days but less than a year for each
of his three prior offenses, and that he was released from the most recent
sentence more than l\vo years ago, he \vould have six Critninal History points.
See id.§ 4Al.I. This would put him in Criminal History Category Ill. See id.
ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table}.
100

/d. (sentencing table).

"'See Bowman, supra note 8, at 747 ("The Guidelines can and should be made
simpler, both in terms of use by legal professionals and their comprehensibility
to nonprofessionals affected by the results they generate.").
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'"The general federal bank robbery statute has a statutory maximum of twenty
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1998). Another five years would be added for
carrying the gun, if the prosecution charged and convicted the defendant
accordingly. See id.§ 924(c).
103

Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 706.
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As Professor Bo\vman says, "The workings of the guidelines are complicated,
but at least they are visible." Id. at 707-08; see also id. at 720 (describing
openness of guidelines system as one of its strengths).

'°'"No person shall be ... deprived of ... liberty ... without due process of law
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'°'The most recent figure was 48,848, from fiscal year 1997. U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, supra note 63, at vii (1998).
107
111e data is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research at the University of Michigan. For details, visit the Intemet
web site for the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at
<http://www.ICPSR.umich.edu/NACJDfl1ome.htrnl>.

wssee Dalzef1 1 supra note 13, at 327~30.

'°'U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1989 11 (1989).
''°Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
"'See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996
SURVEY (1997).
"'Id. at 19. The highest score, 3.6, was shared by drug possession and drug
manufachlfe, import/export, and trafficking. The lowest score, 2.7, was shared
by robbery and fraud.
msee Dalzell, supra note 13, at 333.
114

/d. at 334.
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